We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on naked exclusion. Our key ndings are: First, exclusion of a more ecient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates compared to the non-discriminatory case only when payments to buyers can be oered sequentially and secretly. Third, allowing discrimination does not lead to signicant decreases in costs of exclusion. Accounting for the observation that buyers are more likely to accept an exclusive deal the higher is the payment, substantially improves the t between theoretical predictions and observed behavior.
Introduction
For a long time, exclusive contracts have been hotly debated in antitrust law and in academia. Since the beginning of the 20th century courts have treated rms using exclusive contracts harshly for fear such contracts could be used to exclude rivals and, thus, hamper competition. 1 Starting in the 1950s, scholars belonging to the Chicago school (see, e.g., Director and Levi, 1956; Posner, 1976; Bork, 1978) argued that such fears are not warranted since using exclusive contracts for the sole purpose of anticompetitively excluding rivals would not be in the interest of rational rms. Recently, however, this laissez-faire view has been challenged by various theorists who describe circumstances under which anticompetitive exclusion of rivals may indeed occur. One prominent contribution in this literature is the naked exclusion model put forward by Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000b) [henceforth RRW-SW] . 2 The RRW-SW framework features an incumbent seller, a more ecient entrant and a number of buyers with independent demand. Due to economies of scale caused by, for instance, xed entry costs the entrant needs a suciently high number of free buyers (those not bound by exclusive contracts) to enter the market protably. An exclusive contract in this framework takes the form of a payment from the incumbent to a buyer in exchange for the buyer's promise to buy exclusively from the incumbent.
The main feature of the RRW-SW model is that, under mild assumptions, the incumbent needs to convince only a subset of buyers in the market to sign an exclusive contract to deter entry and can, if successful, extract monopoly prots from all buyers. RRW-SW show that when it is impossible for the incumbent to discriminate between buyers, exclusion is not guaranteed. The reason is that the monopoly prot the incumbent would earn under exclusion is not high enough to compensate a suciently high number of buyers (necessary to achieve exclusion) for their forgone consumer surplus that would result from entry of the more ecient entrant.
The buyers' subgame is a symmetric coordination game with multiple equilibria and exclusion occurs if a suciently high number of buyers fail to coordinate on the (more ecient) rejection equilibrium. If, however, the incumbent is able to discriminate among buyers, exclusion arises with certainty. Indeed, in this case, compensating a subset of the buyers for the forgone consumer surplus that would result from buying from the more ecient entrant is possible and sucient to obtain exclusion. If, in addition, the contract terms are private information or buyers are approached sequentially, RRW-SW show that 1 Early cases include Standard Fashion Company v. Margrane-Houston Company [258 U.S. 346 (1922) ] and United States v. Aluminum Co. of America [148 F.2d 416 (1945) ]. More recent cases include Microsoft [253 F.3d 34 (2001) ], U.S. v. Dentsply [399 F.3d (2001) , and Conwood v. United State Tobacco [290 f.3d 758 (2002) ]]. 2 The term naked refers to the sole purpose of an exclusive deal to audaciously exclude a rival without oering any eciency justication.
exclusion is achieved at negligible costs. The idea is that with private information, a buyer accepts lousy contract terms, because he believes that being oered a lousy contract implies that suciently many other buyers will accept for sure. In the case of sequential contracting, a buyer anticipates that, if he rejects a lousy contract, the incumbent can surely convince enough subsequent buyers to accept by making them oers they cannot refuse.
In this paper, we report the results of a systematic laboratory inquiry into the use of exclusive contracts in the RRW-SW framework. We are particularly interested in whether allowing for discrimination increases exclusion rates and decreases exclusion costs for the incumbent in the case of (private) simultaneous or sequential contracting compared to the case where discrimination is not possible. Therefore, in a rst part of the experiment, incumbents cannot discriminate between buyers, while in a second part, they can.
There are only a few empirical studies analyzing the eect of exclusive contracts; most of them deal with analyzing their eect on prices and welfare in the beer industry. The results are mixed. For instance, whereas Slade (2000) nds a negative eect of exclusive contracts on consumer welfare, Sass (2005) , Asker (2004) , and Asker (2005) report a positive eect. The paucity of empirical studies on the eect of exclusive contractsa fact lamented by, e.g., Whinston (2006) and Lafontaine and Slade (2008) is perhaps not surprising as many of the details that contracts may entail and that determine market outcomes may simply not be available to the outside observer. More importantly, in the light of our results it is conceivable that relevant data on exclusive contracts will continue to be rare, because the most eective contracts enabling exclusion are those that are made secretly (and sequentially).
This is a rst reason why we think that data from the lab are welcome.
Evidence from the lab can contribute to the literature on exclusive dealing for other reasons as well. First, it provides guidance for equilibrium selection in cases where there is a multiplicity of equilibria. For example, in the case of non-discriminatory contract terms, both exclusionary and nonexclusionary outcomes can arise, and there are no clear predictions about how costly exclusion will be for the incumbent. 3 Second, as outlined above, when the size of the payments from the incumbent to buyers is private information or buyers can be approached sequentially by the incumbent, theory makes the stark prediction that exclusion can be achieved (almost) for free. This point hinges on the assumption that in these cases, some buyers will accept any payment, also very small ones, in exchange for exclusivity. However, in the light of the empirical literature on bargaining games, in particular the ultimatum game (see Güth, 1995; Roth, 1995, for overviews) , it is questionable whether this prediction has sucient behavioral relevance.
Our results conrm that anti-competitive exclusion is potentially a serious problem as it occurs in more than two thirds of all cases. We also nd that allowing the incumbent to discriminate between buyers does not necessarily increase exclusion rates compared to the non-discriminatory case, given that full exclusion is not obtained in the latter case. It only does so when payments can be oered sequentially and secretly. Moreover, allowing the incumbent to discriminate between buyers neither leads to a decrease in costs of exclusion when contract terms are private information or in the case of sequential contracting. At rst sight, these results are not in line with the theoretical predictions. The driving force behind the results is that buyers become more likely to accept an exclusive contract as the payment proposed by the incumbent increases. Since such behavior is intuitive, plausible, and a robust phenomenon in our data, we propose to modify the naked exclusion model by modeling buyers' acceptance probability with a logit response function. We show that such modication improves the correspondence between theory and behavior and generates comparative-statics predictions that are largely in line with observed behavior.
Other experimental studies of naked exclusion are Smith (2007) and Spier and Landeo (2009) . Smith (2007) focuses on the case where an incumbent cannot discriminate between buyers and nds that the likelihood of exclusion increases as the incumbent needs fewer buyers to sign exclusive contracts for entry to be deterred. Spier and Landeo (2009) examine the eects of contract endogeneity and communication between buyers in non-discriminatory and discriminatory simultaneous-move games. One of their main ndings is that communication increases the likelihood of exclusion when discrimination between buyers is possible, while it decreases the likelihood of exclusion (and thus increases coordination on the more ecient rejection equilibrium) when it is not possible. Our paper diers from these two studies in two main respects. First, in neither of the earlier experiments can an incumbent approach buyers sequentially, whereas, as we report above, this is the case where exclusion occurs most often. Second, and perhaps most importantly, we propose and discuss a behavioral version of the naked exclusion model of RRW-SW in order to bring theoretical predictions and observed outcomes closer together. 4 Other models study exclusive dealing in a related context. Aghion and Bolton (1987) , for example,
show that a contract written by an incumbent rm and a customer that include exclusionary and damage penalty provisions may lead to inecient foreclosure. The contract allows the incumbent rm and customer to extract surplus from the entrant. Bernheim and Whinston (1998) model exclusive dealing in a multi-market case. They show that exclusive contracts accepted in one market may deter entry 4 Additionally, we allow for a ne grid of possible payments from the incumbent to a buyer in exchange for exclusivity.
This is not the case in both of the earlier experimental studies. In Spier and Landeo (2009) incumbents can only oer 4 dierent payments, and 7 in Smith (2007) .
and reduce welfare because of the fall in competition in another market. Fumagalli and Motta (2006) take into account that buyers might not be nal consumers but rms that compete in a downstream consumer market. They nd that downstream competition might limit the eectiveness of exclusive contracts as an anti-competitive device. An opposite result is found by Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) in a model where customers are able to breach a contract and pay expectation damages.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the naked exclusion model. Section 3 contains the experimental design and procedures, and the hypotheses. In Section 4, we report the results. In Section 5, we discuss a behavioral approach to naked exclusion. Section 6 concludes.
Theory
The RRW-SW model features an incumbent seller, a more ecient entrant, and, in our implementation, two buyers who are nal consumers. Due to, for instance, xed entry costs, the entrant needs to sell to both buyers to make entry protable. Therefore, if the incumbent can induce at least one of the two buyers to sign an exclusive contract, entry is deterred. 5
In our parametric example, the incumbent has unit production costs of c I = 20 and the entrant has unit production costs of c E = 0. The two buyers have independent demand functions given by D(p) = 50 − p. The model has three stages. In a rst stage the incumbent oers to pay x 1 , x 2 ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} to buyer 1 and 2, respectively, and the buyers either accept or reject the proposed amount. By accepting, a buyer signs a contract with the incumbent in which he promises to buy exclusively from the incumbent. In a second stage the decisions of the two buyers become publicly known and the entrant decides about entry. In a third stage, all active rms set prices and payos ensue.
Solving the game backwards, consider rst the case where entry occurs (i.e., both buyers reject the incumbent's oer). In this case, the entrant will set a price of p E = c I = 20 (or slightly below) and thus will sell to both free buyers. This leaves the incumbent with zero prot and generates a consumer surplus of CS E = 450 for each buyer. If entry does not occur, the incumbent has monopoly power over both buyers and monopoly pricing leads to a (gross) total prot of π m = 450 for the incumbent and a consumer surplus of CS I = 112.5 for each buyer. The net prot of the incumbent is then either In order to avoid zero earnings for the incumbent in the case entry occurs, and thus potential frustration on the part of subjects acting in the role of an incumbent in the experiment, we add 50
to the nal payos of all active players. 7 Under this parameterization, the incumbent earns 50 in the case of entry and 500 minus the sum of the accepted payments in the case of exclusion. The payo matrix of the buyers is as shown in Table 1 . To illustrate, if at least one buyer accepts payment x oered by the incumbent, entry is deterred and the accepting buyer(s) earn 165 (= 115 + 50) + x. A buyer who rejects, earns 165 in the case of entry deterrence. If both buyers reject such that the more ecient entrant would enter the market, the buyers earn 500 = CS E + 50 each. The extra consumer surplus of entry for a single buyer is thus equal to 335 = CS E − CS I .
If the incumbent cannot discriminate between buyers, such that x 1 = x 2 = x, both exclusionary and non-exclusionary equilibria exist. To ensure exclusion the incumbent would have to oer at least x = 335 such that both buyers are sure to accept (see Table 1 ). However, such an oer would lead to negative prots for the incumbent as 500 − 2 × 335 < 0. For oers of x ≤ 335, the buyers play a symmetric coordination game. Hence, there are two classes of subgame-perfect equilibria: exclusion equilibria where x ∈ [0, 225] and both buyers accept 8 and no-exclusion equilibria where x ∈ [0, 335] and both buyers reject. Successful exclusion is thus obtained if buyers fail to coordinate on rejecting the incumbent's payment. 9 We refer to this game in which the incumbent makes oers simultaneously and cannot discriminate between buyers as SimNon. 10 6 We round the consumer surplus of 112.5 up to CS I = 115 in order to avoid crooked payos in the experiment. 7 In our experiment, the entrant is simulated. See Section 3 for more details on the design. 8 The upper bound on oers in this class of equilibria is due to the fact that for oers x > 250 incumbents would make losses. 9 In the buyers' subgame, risk dominance predicts that both buyers reject if x < 167.5 and both buyers accept if
x > 167.5. Buyers are indierent for x = 167.5 (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) . Note also that only non-exclusionary equilibria are perfectly coalition-proof (see Segal and Whinston, 2000b) . 10 Note that we focus on pure strategy equilibria. However, there also exist mixed strategy equilibria in the buyers' subgame. These have the property that the probability of acceptance decreases with the oer in order to keep the other buyer indierent between accepting and rejecting. As this property is clearly rejected by the data we do not consider A dierent strategic game arises when the incumbent can discriminate between buyers by simultaneously oering them dierent payments in exchange for exclusivity. In this case, given that an incumbent needs to convince only one buyer to sign an exclusionary contract and his total monopoly prot is suciently high to do this (500 > 335), the entrant can be excluded with certainty (see case A of Proposition 3 in Segal and Whinston, 2000b) and only exclusionary equilibria exist. The costs of exclusion depend on whether the amounts oered by the incumbent are observable for both buyers.
In the case of perfect observability (we call this game SimDis-P where the P stands for public), exclusion costs lie anywhere between zero and 336. Indeed, in one subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium the incumbent oers a payment of 335 or 336 to one buyer, who accepts, and zero to the other buyer, who rejects. In other subgame-perfect Nash equilibria oers to both buyers are positive and sum up to an amount smaller than or equal to 336 and both buyers accept. 11 In the case of secret contracts, where a buyer cannot observe the amount oered to the other buyer (we call this game SimDis-S where the S stands for secret), the incumbent obtains exclusion for free. In fact, under passive beliefs, the unique (perfect Bayesian) Nash equilibrium predicts the incumbent to oer (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 0) and both buyers accept. 12 Finally, RRW-SW consider the case where the incumbent can write contracts with the buyers sequentially. More specically, here the incumbent rst makes an oer to one buyer (buyer 1), who decides whether to accept or reject, and then to the other buyer (buyer 2) whoafter being informed about buyer 1's decisionalso decides whether to accept or reject. We refer to this game as Seq-P, where the P indicates that the oer made to buyer 1 becomes (publicly) known to buyer 2. In this game exclusion again arises for sure and almost for free. Indeed, in the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium the incumbent oers zero or one to buyer 1 who accepts and zero to buyer 2 who rejects or accepts. The reason that buyer 1 accepts a payment of zero or one is that he knows that if he equilibria in mixed strategies. 11 In the buyers' subgame, risk dominance predicts that both buyers accept if x 1 x 2 > (335 − x 1 )(x 2 − 335), or equivalently, x1 + x2 > 335. If x1 + x2 < 335 both buyers reject and if x1 + x2 = 335 they are indierent (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) . 12 Under passive beliefs, a buyer receiving an out-of equilibrium oer, believes that the other buyer received the equilibrium oer (see McAfee and Schwartz, 1994) . To see that the equilibrium is unique under passive beliefs, consider an oer (x1, x2) which is rejected by both buyers. This cannot be an equilibrium as the seller can deviate from this by oering 335 (or 336) to one buyer and get acceptance. Next, consider as candidate equilibrium the oer (x 1 , x 2 ) with x2 ∈ [1, 335] . If buyer 1 accepts, this cannot be an equilibrium as buyer 2 should accept as well in this case and the seller could have saved money by setting x 2 = 0. If buyer 1 rejects, buyer 2 should reject as well, which cannot be an equilibrium, as we just explained. Note that this reasoning holds for any x 1 < 335 and in particular for x 1 = 0. Hence oers of 0 to both buyers and both buyers accepting is the only equilibrium outcome (see Segal and Whinston, 2000b) .
Note also that wary beliefs (see McAfee and Schwartz, 1994) deliver the same result.
would reject, the incumbent would make buyer 2 an oer he cannot refuse (≥ 335). Given that buyer 1 accepts (and hence entry is deterred), buyer 2 is oered zero. In a second version of this sequential game, buyer 2 is only informed about whether or not buyer 1 accepted his oer but not about the oer itself. We refer to this game as Seq-S, where the S indicates that the oer to buyer 1 is a secret to buyer 2. The dierence in information conditions between the two sequential games with respect to buyer 2 is inconsequential for the subgame-perfect equilibrium prediction. Hence predictions in this game are the same as in Seq-P.
Experimental procedures and hypotheses
The experiment was run in May and October 2007 in CentERlab at Tilburg University with mainly economics, business, and law students (180 in total). 13 Sessions took about 90 minutes and participants earned e18.81 on average.
Since we are interested in the interaction between the incumbent and the buyers, there was no entrant present in our experiments. To generate payos for the incumbent and the buyers, we assumed subgame-perfect behavior of the entrant with respect to both his entry and pricing decision. This leads to buyers' (truncated) payo table as shown in Table 1 , with the only dierence that a payo of 50 was added to all entries of each cell as mentioned in the theory section. All participants in a session received the same instructions, containing the payo tables of the incumbent and the buyers. 14 The experiment consisted of two parts and subjects were informed about this. Instructions for the second part were distributed after completion of the rst part. Subjects were informed that monetary earnings would depend on the cumulative earnings made throughout the experiment. In the instructions, payos were denoted in points and, in order to cover potential losses of participants acting in the role of an incumbent, all participants were initially endowed with 1600 points. The conversion rate of points into Euro was 400:1. In order to ensure that subjects understood the instructions, they were asked to answer a series of control questions before the experiment started. After having correctly answered the control questions, subjects were randomly assigned a role, which was xed throughout the experiment. 15 The experiment has four treatments and the conditions in the treatments only dier with respect to the second part. Table 2 provides an overview of the experimental conditions. In the rst part of the 13 We used the z-Tree toolbox to program the experiment (Fischbacher, 2007 Table 2 : Overview of treatments and number of observations experiment subjects played game SimNon, i.e., the non-discriminatory version of the naked exclusion game and in the second part they played a discriminatory game. In the rst part, incumbents were asked to make a (symmetric) oer to the matched buyers, after which the buyers had to decide independently and simultaneously whether to accept or reject the oer. In order to allow for learning, the same game was repeated ten times. 16 After each repetition, information was provided to incumbents and buyers about acceptance decisions and own payos, and participants were randomly rematched within matching groups of nine subjects each (three incumbents and six buyers).
In the second part of the experiment, subjects played one of the four discriminatory games, i.e., either Simdis-P, SimDis-S, Seq-P, or Seq-S. In games Simdis-P and Simdis-S, incumbents made their oers simultaneously to both buyers, while in games Seq-P and Seq-S, sequentially. The discriminatory games were also repeated ten times and participants were randomly rematched within the same matching groups as in the rst part. At the end of each repetition, subjects were again informed about acceptance decisions and own payos. Participants acting in the role of a buyer in the discriminatory games alternated between being buyer 1 and buyer 2 and were informed about this. This switching was implemented in order to avoid the possibility that an incumbent always discriminated the same buyer subject.
The RRW-SW model predicts that in SimNon, there is a multiplicity of equilibria where either both buyers reject or both buyers accept the oer made by the incumbent. The exclusion rate can thus lie anywhere between 0 and 1. Under a discriminatory regime, however, both buyers rejecting cannot be part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, implying that the exclusion rate is predicted to be equal to 1. One would thus expect the exclusion rate to increase in the discriminatory games played in part 2 compared to the non-discriminatory game played in part 1 of the experiment. This is our rst hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 The exclusion rate increases in the discriminatory games Simdis-P, SimDis-S, Seq- 16 In treatment 1, one matching group played the game only eight times in both parts of the experiment.
P, and Seq-S compared to the non-discriminatory game SimNon, as long as it is strictly below 1 in the latter game.
Similarly, with respect to the costs of exclusion for incumbents, the predictions of the RRW-SW model are clear-cut for three of the four discriminatory games (SimDis-S, Seq-P and Seq-S): they are predicted to be either 0 or 1. Compared to the non-discriminatory game, where the costs can lie anywhere above 0, one would thus expect to see a decrease in part 2 compared to part 1 in these three cases. This is our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Exclusion costs decrease in the discriminatory games SimDis-S, Seq-P, and Seq-S compared to the non-discriminatory game SimNon, as long as they are strictly above one in the latter game.
Results
In Subsection 4.1 we provide an overview of the main experimental results. In Subsection 4.2 we give a more detailed account of the incumbents' oers and the buyers' acceptance behavior in the ve games and pave the way to a behavioral approach to naked exclusion.
Main results
We test the two research hypotheses by analyzing the incremental eects on outcomes when moving from SimNon to SimDis-P, SimDis-S, Seq-P, or Seq-S, respectively. Table 3 gives an overview of the observed average exclusion rates and costs in part 1 (SimNon) and the average change in exclusion rates and costs in the dierent parts 2 compared to the related part 1. The exclusion rate is dened as the share of cases in which the incumbent was able to exclude the entrant from the market, that is, the share of cases in which at least one buyer accepts the incumbent's oer. The costs of exclusion are equal to the sum of the accepted amounts oered by the incumbent, given exclusion. The table also indicates the direction of the change in exclusion rates and costs predicted by theory when moving from the rst-part game SimNon to any of the second-part games. For instance, the + in column 2 next to SimDis-P means that theory predicts the exclusion rate to increase in this game in comparison to game SimNon (conditional on the exclusion rate in SimNon being lower than 1). The eect of allowing discrimination on exclusion rates and costs rates to increase and exclusion costs to decrease in parts 2. What the table shows, however, is that average exclusion rates in parts 2 do not necessarily increase. Average exclusion rates even decrease in SimDis-P, SimDis-S and Seq-P compared to the related SimNon, although this is not signicant. 17 Only when Seq-S is played in part 2, does the average exclusion rate increase signicantly by 25
percentage points compared to part 1. A consequence of this is that payos of incumbents in Seq-S increase and payos of buyers decrease signicantly (at the 10% and 5% level, respectively, in one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests). The only case in which Hypothesis 1 is not rejected is thus the case in which oers are made sequentially and secretly.
With respect to exclusion costs, Table 3 shows that they increase on average in Seq-P and Seq-S compared to SimNon, although this is not signicant. Only in SimDis-S does exclusion become 17 Note that the same qualitative results hold if the analyses are based on the nal ve rounds of each part of the experiment when subjects have gained experience. If a less conservative procedure is used to evaluate statistical signicance of dierences between parts 1 and 2i.e., regressions by treatment where a dummy is included that refers to (the discriminatory) part 2the decrease in exclusion rate in SimDis-S compared to the related SimNon is signicant at the 5% level, which is in line with results presented by Spier and Landeo (2009) . However, this signicance disappears in the nal ve rounds.
cheaper on average compared to SimNon, but the decrease is statistically not signicant. 18 Overall, hypothesis 2 is thus rejected.
Our main nding so far is that the exclusion rate does not increase signicantly in three of the four part-2 discriminatory games vis-à-vis the part-1 non-discriminatory game. One may argue that this observation might be due to our within-subject design and that with a between-subject design it would have been more likely to observe a clear increase in exclusion rates in all discriminatory games vis-à-vis the non-discriminatory game. 19 However, there is evidence that cautions against such a conclusion.
First, in a pilot session where game SimDis-P was run without a preceding game SimNon, the average exclusion rate was 0.71 which is of the same order of magnitude as the one we report above (0.66).
Second, in contrast to our within-subject design, Spier and Landeo (2009) use a between-subject design.
They nd that the exclusion rate in their discriminatory treatment does not increase in comparison to their non-discriminatory game treatment. 20 Moreover, the result that in the part-2 game Seq-S we do observe a signicant increase in the exclusion rate compared to the part-1 game SimNon, demonstrates that our design does allow for a dierential eect of the part-2 games. Finally, although outcomes look similar in the part-2 games (except for Seq-S), subjects do behave dierently in the dierent part-2 games, as will become clear in subsection 4.2.
A closer look at behavior in the ve games
In this subsection we take a closer look at the behavior in the individual games and highlight the most salient features of the data. a. Simultaneous non-discriminatory game Table 4 shows the distribution of oers made by incumbents, acceptance rates of buyers and incumbents' prots in SimNon. The table shows that, rst, about 86% of incumbents' oers are between 95 and 214 with a peak in the range 135-174. Second, the average prot of incumbents has an inverted-U shape with a maximum in the range 135-174. Third, the acceptance rate of buyers increases monotonically with the amount of the payment and is slightly above 50% in the range of oers 135-174.
Incumbents thus seem to be successful in oering those amounts that maximize their prots. A potential rationale is that incumbents choose oers in such a way that the probability that exactly 18 Using less conservative regression results makes this decrease signicant at the 5% level as long as all observations are taken into account and not just the nal ve rounds. 19 In a within-subject design, the same subjects are observed in dierent experimental treatments, whereas in a betweensubject design dierent subjects are observed in dierent experimental treatments. 20 See Result 1 in Spier and Landeo (2009) Smith, 2007) . 21 Therefore, it looks as if incumbents choose payments so as to maximize prots taking into account buyers' acceptance behavior.
Finally, that the acceptance rate of buyers increases with the amount of the payment is consistent with experimental evidence from coordination games (e.g., stag hunt). Indeed, players in such games take ceteris paribus less risk to coordinate on the ecient equilibrium when the risky payo is lower or the payo corresponding to the safe alternative is higher (see, e.g., Battalio, Samuelson and Huyck, 2001; Schmidt et al., 2003) . Translated to the naked exclusion context, buyers take less risk to reject an oer made by the incumbent if the oer, and thus the payo from accepting, is higher.
b. Simultaneous discriminatory games
Behavior in the simultaneous discriminatory games is summarized in Table 5 , in which we show combinations of minimum oers (rows) and maximum oers (columns). A bold number in the table indicates the relative frequency with which a specic combination of oers was chosen by sellers, while the number below (in normal font) indicates the corresponding exclusion rate at this combination of oers. Consider rst treatment SimDis-P (the upper part of Table 5 ) where oers are publicly known.
Two observations stand out. First, in 16.7% of the cases the minimum oer is in the interval [0-14] while the maximum oer is in the interval [335] [336] [337] [338] [339] [340] [341] [342] [343] [344] [345] [346] [347] [348] [349] [350] . This is the outcome emphasized by various authors (see, e.g., Motta, 2004; Whinston, 2006) . Here, one buyer is oered an amount that is a bit larger than 335 (which makes accepting the oer a dominant strategy) and the other buyer is oered zero or very little. As predicted by the theory, an incumbent who makes such oers is successful in deterring 21 Data from post-experimental questionnaires also point in this direction. Consider next the lower part of Table 5 which shows the results in game SimDis-S where a buyer is not informed about the amount oered to the other buyer in the market. The distribution of oers is clearly dierent from the one in SimDis-P. First, the importance of discriminatory oer combinations [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] and [335] [336] [337] [338] [339] [340] [341] [342] [343] [344] [345] [346] [347] [348] [349] [350] is reduced. Second, (roughly) symmetric oer combinations are much less common than in SimDis-P. The reason is that in SimDis-S there is a change in the distribution of minimum oers compared to SimDis-P while the distribution of maximum oers remains largely unchanged (except for a decrease of maximum oers in range [335] [336] [337] [338] [339] [340] [341] [342] [343] [344] [345] [346] [347] [348] [349] [350] ). That is, in SimDis-S the distribution of minimum oers (measured by the row totals in Table 5 ) has much more mass on lower oers. In fact, while oers that fall into the two lowest categories of minimum oers account for only 35.5% of the cases in treatment SimDis-P, they account for 73.3% of all cases in treatment SimDis-S. 24 However, 22 Spier and Landeo (2009) observe these divide-and-conquer oers more frequently than we do, which is, arguably, not surprising given that the action space for the incumbent is restricted to four possible payments. 23 Again, one might object that the low incidence of extremely unequal oers (oer combinations of [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] and [335-350]) we observe in game SimDis-P is an artefact of our design that has subjects rst play the game in which incumbents can only make non-discriminatory oers which are symmetric by denition. However, in a pilot session in which subjects only participated in game SimDis-P, those extremely unequal oers occurred in only about 10.5% of the cases which is about 6 percentage points less than the corresponding share we report above. 24 A linear regression where the minimum oer made is regressed on a SimDis-S dummy indicates that the dierence in oers is signicant (p < 0.001). Another linear regression indicates that the dierence in maximum oer is also signicant (and lower in SimDis-S), but this signicance disappears when one only considers the nal ve rounds, when subjects have experience. The regressions mentioned include random eects taking into account the nested panel structure and standard errors taking into account possible dependency within independent observations. while behavior in SimDis-S is dierent from SimDis-P, and costs of exclusion are on average lower, it does not come close to what theory predicts, i.e., that exclusion should be reached with oers of zero. This is because, also here, the probability that buyers accept an oer increases with the size of one's own oer and very low oers (in the range [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] ) are never accepted. Incumbents seem to realize this and take it into account when deciding which amounts to oer.
Finally, although this is not immediately clear from Table 5 , we should mention that also in SimDis-P, there is a positive relation between the oered payment and the acceptance rate of buyers (more on this in Section 5.2).
c. Sequential games
Recall that we have two versions of the sequential game. While in Seq-P the second buyer is informed about both the oer made to buyer 1 and the latter's acceptance decision, in Seq-S buyer 2 only knows whether or not buyer 1 has accepted his oer. Table 6 gives percentages of cases and acceptance rates as a function of oers in the sequential games. The data are provided separately for buyers 1 and 2; and for buyers 2 depending on whether the corresponding buyer 1 has accepted or rejected his own oer. We will show, among other things, that acceptance decisions of buyers depend on the size of the oers, also in Seq-P and Seq-S.
Consider rst oers made by the incumbent to buyer 1 and the acceptance behavior of the latter. Table 6 shows that the mode of oers to buyer 1 is in the range , which is far above the theoretical prediction of zero or one. A possible reason that incumbents oer such large amounts is that buyers 1 (almost) never accept low oers in the range [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . In fact, in Seq-P the acceptance rate in range [0-14] is 0 and in Seq-S it is 9%. However, we observe that acceptance rates of buyers 1 are positively related to the size of the oer, for both Seq-P and Seq-S, and that incumbents seem to take this into account.
Note the equivalence here between behavior of buyers 1 in the naked exclusion game and responders in ultimatum game experiments. Indeed, from ultimatum game experiments we know that there is a positive relation between proposers' oers and responders' acceptance rates. Oers considered too low are rejected frequently, which results in dramatic payo consequences for both players (see Güth, 1995; Roth, 1995, for overviews) . Anticipating this, most proposers oer substantial amounts to the responder. In both sequential naked exclusion games an incumbent knows that once his oer to buyer 1 is rejected, he needs to make an oer of 335 or 336 to buyer 2 to achieve exclusion and this would make him earn only 164 or 165. Hence, anticipating rejections of small payments by buyer 1 that result in low prots, the incumbent might oer relatively high amounts to buyer 1. Regarding oers made to buyer 2 and acceptance behavior of the latter, the picture looks as follows.
On the one hand, in cases where buyer 1 accepts his oer, around 90% of the time incumbents oer very low amounts to buyer 2 in Seq-P and Seq-S. This is, allowing for some noise, what one would expect from a rational, payo-maximizing incumbent who knows that once buyer 1 accepts, exclusion is achieved and it is not necessary to make a payment to buyer 2. On the other hand, in cases where buyer 1 rejects, incumbents mostly oer very high amounts to buyers 2: around 50% of the time the oer is in the range [335] [336] [337] [338] [339] [340] [341] [342] [343] [344] [345] [346] [347] [348] [349] [350] in both games, and in about 13% (21%) of the time in game Seq-S (Seq-P) the oer is even above 350. In Seq-P, where oers to buyer 2 in the range [335] [336] [337] [338] [339] [340] [341] [342] [343] [344] [345] [346] [347] [348] [349] [350] are accepted less than 40% of the time, it turns out that oering an amount above 350 might even be necessary to convince buyers 2 to accept. As is the case with buyer 1, buyer 2 is more likely to accept oers of the same size in Seq-S than in The observed dierence in buyers' acceptance behavior between Seq-P and Seq-S is potentially related to dierences in buyer 1's abilities to signal his intention. In Seq-P, by rejecting a relatively high oer, buyer 1 arguably sends a strong signal to buyer 2 saying that he takes a relatively high risk in order to indicate his intention to reach the high-payo rejection equilibrium. In Seq-S, buyer 1 cannot send this kind of signal since buyer 2 does not receive information about the size of the (rejected) amount. Therefore, for a given amount oered, buyers 2 accept more often in Seq-S than in Seq-P. Anticipating this inability to (forcefully) signal intentions, buyers 1 also accept more often in Seq-S than in Seq-P. 25 A logit regression where the acceptance decision of buyer 1 is regressed on the oer made to buyer 1 and a Seq-S dummy indicates that the dierence between Seq-P and Seq-S is indeed statistically signicant (p = 0.022). A linear regression where the oer made to buyer 1 is regressed on a Seq-S dummy only indicates that the dierence in oers is not signicant (p = 0.510). In the last ve rounds, the p-value is much lower (p = 0.106), though, which could suggest that there is some learning on the part of incumbents. The regressions mentioned include random eects taking into account the nested panel structure. Standard errors are corrected for possible dependency within independent observations. 26 The dierence in buyer 2's behavior between Seq-P and Seq-S is again statistically signicant (p = 0.038), while the dierence in incumbents' oers to buyer 2 after a rejection of buyer 1 is not (p = 0.210).
Towards a behavioral approach to naked exclusion
In the preceding section, it became clear that, in all games, the buyers' acceptance probability is positively related to the incumbents' proposed payments. Therefore, a natural way to summarize buyer behavior is to estimate the acceptance probability as a function of the proposed payments, for example by means of a logistic response function (see, e.g., Slonim and Roth, 1998 , in the context of an ultimatum game). This is what we do in Subsection 5.1. The regression results conrm that, in all games, the buyers' acceptance probability depends positively and signicantly on the incumbents' proposed payments. 27 In the light of this result, we think that any adjustment to the naked exclusion model should start with a modeling alternative that predicts the positive relationship between incumbents' oers and buyers' acceptance probability. In other words, instead of assuming subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play in the buyers' subgame, a solution concept should be employed that predicts that buyers are more likely to accept the higher is the own (and other) oer.
One solution concept that delivers this result is the quantal-response equilibrium (QRE) (see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2005) . The basic idea of the QRE is that players (in our case, buyers) make mistakes, but that less costly mistakes are more likely than more costly ones (in our case, buyers are more likely to accept a high oer than a low oer). As we show in Appendix A.2, QRE gives rise to a probability of acceptance that can be approximated by a logit function.
Another alternative delivering the desirable relationship between incumbents' oers and buyers' acceptance probability is risk dominance combined with players having heterogeneous risk preferences.
Recall, for example, that in the buyers' subgame in SimNon, risk dominance predicts that (both) buyers reject when the oer is low (x < 167.5), (both) accept when it is high (x > 167.5) and are indierent when x = 167.5. If risk preferences are heterogeneous such that dierent players switch at dierent thresholds, one could argue that the buyer behavior observed in SimNon is in line with risk dominance. 28 This is illustrated in Figure 3 in Appendix A.4 that plots the acceptance probability predicted by risk dominance and, additionally, an estimated logit function of the general form P(Accept) = F (α + βOer + ) (see also Subsection 5.1). For buyer behavior in game SimDis-P, a similar argument can be made. Here, an estimated logit function that regresses a buyer's acceptance 27 An exception is the estimated coecient of buyers 2 in Seq-S, given that buyer 1 has accepted. This estimate is statistically not signicant. 28 Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2009) show that in symmetric stag hunt games, a majority of subjects uses threshold strategies. They suggest dierent models, some inspired by global games, to organize this behavior.
probability on both oers can be argued to be in line with risk dominance, as dened in footnote 11, combined with heterogeneity of risk preferences. 29 In this paper we refrain from trying to identify which of these alternative modeling approaches best captures the behavior we observe in the buyers' subgames. Rather, we conne ourselves to suggesting these alternatives and illustrating that they give rise to probability-of-acceptance functions that can be approximated by logit functions. For our analysis below (predicting incumbents' oers to buyers), we simply work with such estimated logit functions as they most accurately summarize the behavior of buyers observed in the various games.
In Subsection 5.2, we perform the following exercise. We recompute incumbents' optimal oers and resulting market outcomes using the estimated response functions of buyers obtained in Subsection 5.1. That is, instead of assuming subgame-perfect behavior (as RRW-SW do), we use buyers' observed behavior in the subgames as an input into the incumbents' maximization problem. We show that this behavioral approach to the naked exclusion model organizes observed incumbent behavior and game outcomes quite well. In particular, once buyer behavior is modeled more realistically, our exercise shows that the behavioral RRW-SW model does not necessarily predict that exclusion rates should increase in discriminatory games compared to the non-discriminatory one, nor that exclusion costs should fall dramatically in SimDis-S, Seq-P and Seq-S. Before presenting the details, a number of remarks are in order.
First, as we use observed buyer behavior to predict incumbents' average oers in all games, it is perhaps not too surprising that we see a much improved t between (new) predictions and observed behavior of incumbents. Nevertheless, the exercise shows that once actually observed buyer behavior is taken into account, observed incumbents' behavior (which often deviates substantially from the RRW-SW predictions) can be rationalized.
Second, for some cases RRW-SW predict corner solutions (exclusion rates of 1 and exclusion costs of 0 or 1), while our experimental results show that average behavior is less extreme. Any alternative prediction, that does not coincide with RRW-SW, will therefore necessarily improve the t between our observed data and the alternative prediction (including random behavior on the part of subjects).
However, our modication of the RRW-SW model captures a clear and systematic (and intuitive) pattern in the observed buyer data and is therefore a meaningful adjustment to the original RRW-SW framework.
Third, as suggested above, we only add (e.g., QRE) perturbations or noise to the buyers' prots or 29 Yet another approach that gives rise to a positive relation between proposed payments and acceptance probability, is one where buyers who fail to coordinate on rejecting, suer from an emotional cost. See Section A.3 in the Appendix for a more detailed discussion of psychological costs from miscoordination in the context of the naked exclusion model. actions, and not to those of the incumbent. The reason is that adding perturbations to an incumbent's prots would not add much to the analysis except for explaining why the incumbent makes out-ofequilibrium oers. The point is that buyers see the incumbent's oer before they decide and hence adding incumbent noise does not create a strategic eect. This is dierent when it comes to perturbing buyers' payos.
Fourth, the result that our behavioral RRW-SW model predicts that exclusion rates do not necessarily increase and exclusion costs do not necessarily decrease in discriminatory games compared to the non-discriminatory one, is not an artefact of the specic parameters estimated for the buyers' (logit) response function. This is illustrated in Appendix A.5 where we show for Seq-P that the qualitative predictions are robust to changes in the estimated parameters of the response function of buyers.
In all, we view this section as a step towards an intuitive but simple behavioral approach to naked exclusion. It consists of substituting standard subgame-perfect behavior of buyers by a response function predicted by e.g. QRE or risk dominance + noise and keeping all other features of the RRW-SW framework intact; in particular the assumption that incumbents in the rst stage maximize their prots anticipating buyers' behavior in the subgames. As we will demonstrate below, this minimal change substantially increases the correspondence between theory and aggregate observed behavior.
Buyers' acceptance behavior
We estimate the buyers' acceptance probability as a logit function of the oered amounts. In the cases where the amounts oered to both buyers are the same or where a buyer has no information about the oer made to the other buyer in the market, only a buyer's own oer is included in the regression (in SimNon, SimDis-S, Seq-S and for buyer 1 in Seq-P). In other cases, the oer made to the other buyer in the market is included as well (in SimDis-P and for buyer 2 in Seq-P). Table 7 presents the estimation results for the ve games and conrms that, overall, the relation between the size of a buyer's own oer and his acceptance probability is positive and signicant.
As mentioned, only in Seq-S this is not the case for the second-moving buyer who knows that the rst-moving buyer has accepted.
For SimDis-P, it turns out that whether buyers accept or reject does not only depend signicantly on the size of their own oer, but alsoalbeit less stronglyon the size of the oer made to the other buyer in the market. If a buyer assumes that the higher the oer the other buyer receives, the more likely it is that the other buyer will accept his contract such that coordination on both buyers rejecting becomes less likely, the more likely a buyer will accept as well and not take the risk to reject. In Seq-P, on the other hand, the acceptance decision of buyer 2 is not signicantly related to the oer made to buyer 1. Note, however, that the negative sign of this relation, given that buyer 1 rejects, is in line with the signaling-of-intentions story advanced above.
Incumbents' behavior and new predictions
In this subsection, we predict incumbents' average oers (and implied average market outcomes) using buyers' observed response functions as estimated in Table 7 . More precisely, when deciding which amounts to oer to buyers, we assume that an incumbent maximizes his expected prot taking into account that the probability that buyers accept oers is positively related to the size of the amount in the way described in Table 7 . Tables 8 and 9 compare the predictions of RRW-SW and the observed outcomes with the predictions of the modied version of the RRW-SW model.
a. Simultaneous non-discriminatory game
In SimNon we assume that the probability that a buyer accepts an oer of size x is described by the logistic function F (x) = 1 1+e −(α+βx) , with the estimates for α and β, i.e.,α andβ given in Table 7 . Given that a buyer's response function is described by F (x), the probability that two, exactly one, or none of the buyers accept the incumbent's oer x is given by F (x) 2 , 2F (x)(1 − F (x)), and (1 − F (x)) 2 , respectively. The payos for the incumbent in these cases are 500 − 2x, 500 − x, and 50, respectively.
Hence the incumbent maximizes expected prots by choosing to oer the amount x that solves
We nd that the predicted size of the oer is x = 158 yielding a predicted exclusion rate of 1 − (1 − F (158)) 2 = 0.77. These predictions are close to what is observed in the experiment: an average oer of 154 and an exclusion rate of 0.67 (see also Tables 8 and 9 ). 30 Exclusion costs are predicted to be equal to 164, which is below the observed average cost of 246.
b. Simultaneous discriminatory games
For SimDis-P it turned out that whether buyers accept or reject does not only depend signicantly 30 Recall that incumbents earn 50, 500-x, and 500-2x if, respectively, no, one, and both sellers accept their oer.
Answers given in the post-experimental questionnaire suggest that incumbents might have wanted to make an oer that maximizes the probability that exactly one buyer accepts. The probability that exactly one buyer accepts is maximized if both buyers accept the oer with probability 0.5. Using the estimated function F (x) above, the solution of the equation 
for matching group i = 1 to 20, buyer j = 1 to 6 and period t = 1 to 20. F is the logit function and nested random eects (ν i and ν ij ) are included. For the regression of buyers 2 in Seq-S given rejection of buyer 1, ν ij was left out because of non-convergence of the ML-estimator. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to possible dependency within matching groups. Two-tailed signicance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by * , * * and * * * , respectively. The predictions in columns RRW-SW are based on the RRW-SW model and the predictions in columns Modied RRW-SW are based on the behavioral naked exclusion model. Observed payments are averages of oered payments averaged over independent observation. In the case of SimDis-P and SimDis-S, x 1 refers to the maximum and x 2 to the minimum oer. In the case of Seq-P and Seq-S, x a 2 and x r 2 refer to amounts oered to buyer 2, given that buyer 1 accepted or rejected, respectively. Table 8 : Predicted and average observed oered payments on the size of their own oer, but also on the size of the oer made to the other buyer in the market.
The probability that a buyer accepts is thus described by the function F (x 1 , x 2 ) = 1 1+e −(α+βx 1 +γx 2 ) , where x 1 and x 2 stand for the oer made to the buyer himself and the oer made to the other buyer in the market, respectively. The parametersα,β, andγ are given in Table 7 .
An incumbent maximizes expected prots by oering (x 1 , x 2 ) that solves
The solution to this problem is that oered payments are symmetric and equal to x 1 = x 2 = 171. The predicted exclusion rate is 0.75, which is more in line with the observed 0.66 than the stark prediction of 1. 31 However, observed exclusion costs (249) are higher than our prediction (171) In SimDis-S, a buyer's acceptance decision can only depend on the own oer because the oer made to the other buyer in the market is not observed. The incumbent's optimization problem is written as follows.
The sum of observed average payments proposed by incumbents (208+89=297) corresponds reasonably well to the amount that makes buyers indierent between accepting and rejecting in the buyers' subgame (x 1 + x 2 = 335). It can only be a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, however, if both buyers accept and this is not what we observe. Notes: The predictions in columns RRW-SW are based on the RRW-SW model and the predictions in columns Modied RRW-SW are based on the behavioral naked exclusion model. Observed outcomes are the averages on which Table 3 is based (see Table 3 for further notes). Table 9 : Predicted and average observed exclusion rates and costs
Using the estimated parameters in Table 7 , the solution to this problem turns out to be asymmetric:
Comparing this to the average observed minimum and maximum oer42 and 204this is a reasonable match. The corresponding exclusion rate equals 0.77, which somewhat overestimates the observed exclusion rate of 0.58, but is less stark than the original RRW-SW prediction.
Exclusion costs are again underestimated by our approach but come closer to the observed ones than the standard prediction.
c. Sequential games
For the sequential games, we again use the same approach of estimating the relevant functions that describe the probability that buyers accept. In theory, there is no coordination problem between the buyers here. However, if e.g. buyers make mistakes or there are emotional costs/benets associated with mis/coordination, the incumbent does not know exactly which oer will make a buyer accept.
This is captured by F (.).
In the Seq-P case we estimate F 1 (x 1 ) which is the probability that the buyer moving rst accepts the oer made to him (x 1 ). If he does, it is optimal for the incumbent to oer 0 to the second-moving buyer (x a 2 = 0). This is also close to what we observe in the data. If the oer x 1 is rejected, the incumbent oers x r 2 to the second-moving buyer. Conditional on the rst oer x 1 we denote the probability that the second oer gets accepted as F 2 (x r 2 , x 1 ). Hence, the incumbent solves
Using the estimates presented in Table 7 we nd x 1 = 223, x a 2 = 0, x r 2 = 378 yielding an exclusion rate of 0.91. These predictions are closer to the observed average oers of, respectively, 188, 9 and 301, and to the observed exclusion rate of 0.71 than the original predictions. And so are exclusion costs (232 vs. 265).
In Seq-S, the second buyer observes whether the rst oer was accepted or not, but he does not observe the size of this (accepted or rejected) oer. In this case, we estimate an acceptance probability F 1 (x 1 ) for the rst buyer and, conditional on x 1 being rejected, we estimate the acceptance probability F 1 (x r 2 ) for the second buyer. Like in Seq-P, if the rst oer is accepted, the optimal second oer is zero, which is mostly consistent with what is observed in the data (x a 2 = 0). The incumbent's optimization problem becomes
Using the parameters estimated in Table 7 , we nd x 1 = 178, x a 2 = 0, x r 2 = 304 and an exclusion rate of 0.92. As in Seq-P these predictions are closer to the observed oers of, respectively, 177, 9 and 260, and an exclusion rate of 0.84 than the very small oers and the exclusion rate predicted by the original naked exclusion model. Exclusion costs are again estimated to be much higher compared to the original prediction, and this is also what is observed.
Summary and concluding remarks
Recent studies on exclusive dealing show that under certain circumstances inecient exclusion can be achieved using exclusivity clauses. In particular, absent eciency-enhancing eects of exclusivity and in the presence of economies of scale for the entrant, RRW-SW show that an incumbent can take advantage of coordination problems between buyers in order to achieve anti-competitive exclusion. If the incumbent cannot discriminate between buyers by oering them dierent payments, RRW-SW show that exclusion cannot be guaranteed. They also show that in the case where discrimination between buyers is possible, exclusion is obtained with certainty and should thus be observed more frequently than in the non-discriminatory case. Moreover, if the contracted payments are private information or buyers can be approached sequentially, exclusion is not only certain, but almost costless as well, such that one should see exclusion costs fall compared to the non-discriminatory case.
In our laboratory experiment, we nd that exclusion occurs in more than two thirds of the cases and is thus, potentially, a serious problem. However, exclusion rates do not necessarily increase when discrimination between buyers is possible compared to the case where it is not possible. Exclusion rates only increase when payments can be oered sequentially and secretly. Moreover, in all cases, the costs of exclusion for incumbents are substantial and do not decrease signicantly when predicted by theory.
The driving force behind these results is that there exists a positive relation between buyers' acceptance probability and the amount of the payment proposed by the incumbent, which is an intuitive and plausible nding and, arguably, recognized by competition authorities. 32 Therefore, we suggest to modify the existing naked exclusion model, by modeling the buyers' acceptance decision in the subgames as an increasing function of the payment (keeping all other aspects of the RRW-SW framework intact).
This function might be a logit function, which is consistent with, for example, quantal-response equilibrium. We show that such a modication increases the t between the predictions of the RRW-SW model and the experimental observations substantially. The most important implication is that the theoretical predictions become less extreme. In fact, exclusion is no longer obtained with certainty in discriminatory regimes, and exclusion costs are substantially above zero, close to a level observed in the case of non-discriminatory contracts. Moreover, the modied model predicts exclusion rates to be higher under sequential than under simultaneous (discriminatory) contracting with buyers, which is partly corroborated by our experimental results.
Our results might also be relevant for antitrust policy. Indeed, regulatory bodies and courts often have to judge whether an exclusive contract has an eciency rationale. 33 This task is not straightforward, and it is conceivable that erroneous rulings are made. One would hope there exists comprehensive and decisive empirical evidence on the eects of exclusive contracts to help to avoid such misjudgments.
Unfortunately, though, empirical assessments of the use of exclusive contracts are rare and there is reason to believe that it will not be easy to overcome this shortcoming in the near future. Therefore, our paper can contribute to the discussion of the controversial eciency-enhancing versus foreclosure eect of exclusive contracts by analyzing whether the form in which the contract is oered to buyers aects the likelihood of exclusion. More precisely, papers by, among others, Besanko and Perry (1993) and Segal and Whinston (2000a) show how exclusivity clauses can enhance manufacturers' incentives to invest. However, these investment-enhancing eects do not depend on the form in which the exclusive contracts are oered (e.g., simultaneously or sequentially). Here, our results give insights. We nd that the most eective way to achieve exclusion is to approach buyers sequentially and secretly. As we 32 Recent guidelines of the European Commission regarding the abuse of a dominant position state the following on the use of conditional rebates that incumbent rms may give to buyers, potentially in order to exclude rivals: The higher the rebate as a percentage of the total price (...), the stronger the likely foreclosure of actual or potential competitors (EC, 2008) . 33 See, for example, Segal and Whinston's (2000a) cannot see any reason why investment protecting exclusivity clauses should be oered sequentially and secretly to buyers, an argument can be made that contracts oered in this form should be interpreted as aiming at exclusion only. For practical purposes, this would mean that once an investigation uncovers the following two circumstances, an antitrust authority should be on high alert: (i) the suspected company staggered its contracting with buyers over a certain period of time; and (ii) it took active measures to keep secret (previous) oers made (see also Whinston, 2006, p. 147f ).
Our results leave several interesting questions about the use and eect of exclusive contracts unanswered. First, in this study, we have considered the use of contracts that nakedly aim at exclusion.
However, as mentioned above, several papers (such as Besanko and Perry, 1993; Segal and Whinston, 2000a) show that exclusive contracts can be eciency-enhancing by promoting investments. Hence, it would be interesting to study a framework in which contracts can have both exclusionary and eciencyenhancing eects (see Fumagalli, Motta and Ronde, 2007) . Second, the contracts studied here aim at deterring entry. In particular, it was assumed that the adversely aected agent (the entrant) is not present when the incumbent negotiates the contracts with buyers. One can also consider the situation in which a rival to the contracting upstream party is already in the market and can react (e.g., by means of counteroers) to the negotiation process (see Spector, 2007) . Third, one could study markets where buyers are not nal consumers which might limit the eectiveness of exclusive contracts (see Fumagalli and Motta, 2006) .
Introduction
• In this experiment you can earn money by interacting with other participants.
• Your earnings are measured in Points. The number of points that you earn depends on the decisions that you and other participants make.
• For every 400 Points you earn, you will be paid 1 Euro in cash.
• You will start the experiment with 1600 Points in your account. (This is the 4 Euro show-up fee you were promised.)
• Your total number of points at the end of the experiment will be equal to the sum of the points you have earned in each round plus the show-up fee.
• Your identity will remain anonymous to us as well as to the other participants.
• The experiment constists of two parts. Below are the instructions for the rst part. You will receive the instructions for the second part after completion of the rst part.
Description of the rst part of the experiment
The rst part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. The events in each round are as follows:
At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 3 participants. In each group, one participant will act in role A and two participants will act in role B. Then there will be two stages:
Stage 1: The A participant can oer each of the two B participants in his group a payment of X ≥ 0.
The payment X is the same for both B participants.
Stage 2: The two B participants will be informed about X. Then both B participants simultaneously and independently have to decide whether to accept or reject this payment.
Payos
The payos of the A participant This means:
• If none of the B participants accepts the oer, you earn 50;
• If only one B participant accepts the oer, you earn 500 − X;
• If the two B participants accept the oer, you earn 500 − 2X;
• Please note that as an A participant you can make losses. This is the case when only one B participant accepts and the payment X is larger than 500 or when both B participants accept and the payment X is larger than 250.
The payos of the B participants
Imagine that you are a B participant and imagine that you choose rows (Accept or Reject) in the This means:
• If you choose Accept, you earn 165 + X (whether the other B participant accepts or rejects.)
• If you choose Reject, your payo depends on what the other B participant chooses.
If the other B participant accepts, you earn 165.
If the other B participant rejects, you earn 500.
Role assignment and information
• The rst part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds.
• Your role as either an A or a B participant will be determined at the beginning of the experiment and then remains xed for the entire rst part of the experiment.
• Your computer screen (see the top line) indicates which role you act in.
• Please remember that in every round, groups of 3 participants are randomly selected from the pool of participants in the room. We will make sure that each of the groups will always consist of one A participant and two B participants.
• At the end of each round, you will be given the following information about what happened in your own group during the round: the oer made by the A participant, the decisions of the two B participants, and your own payo.
A.1.2. Part 2: SimDis-P
• The main dierence with the rst part is that in the second part A participants can make dierent oers to the B participants.
• For the exact rules of the second part of the experiment, please read the following instructions carefully.
Description of the second part of the experiment
The second part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. The events in each round are as follows:
At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 3 participants. In each group, one participant will act in role A and two participants will act in role B. The two participants acting in role B will be called B1 and B2. Then there will be two stages:
Stage 1: The A participant can oer each of the two B participants in his group a payment. That is, the A participant can oer B1 a payment X1 ≥ 0 and B2 a payment of X2 ≥ 0. The two payments X1 and X2 can be the same or they can be dierent.
Stage 2: The two B participants will be informed about X1 and X2. Then both B participants simultaneously and independently have to decide whether to accept or to reject their own oered payment. That is, B1 decides whether to accept or to reject X1 and (at the same time) B2 decides whether to accept or to reject X2.
Payos
The payos of the A participant • If none of the B participants accepts the oer, you earn 50.
• If only participant Bi (i = 1, 2) accepts the oer, you earn 500 − Xi;
• If the two B participants accept the oer, you earn 500 − X1 − X2;
• Please note that as an A participant you can make losses. This is the case when only participant Bi (i = 1, 2) accepts and the payment Xi is larger than 500 or when both B participants accept and the the sum of the payments X1 and X2 is larger than 500.
The payos of the B participants
Imagine that you are participant Bi (i = 1, 2) who is oered the payment Xi (i = 1, 2) by the A participant, and imagine that you choose rows (Accept or Reject) in the This means:
• If you choose Accept, you earn 165 + Xi (whether the other B participant accepts or rejects.)
Role assignment and information
• The second part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds.
• All participants will act in the same role as in the rst part. That is, an A participant will remain an A participant and a B participant will remain a B participant throughout the second part of the experiment. As a B participant you will alternate acting in role B1 and role B2 across rounds. That is, if you are B1 (or B2) in round 1, you will be B2 (or B1) in round 2. Then, in round 3 you will again be B1 (or B2) and so on.
• Your computer screen (see the top line) indicates in every round which role you act in.
• At the end of each round, you will be given the following information about what happened in your own group during the round: the oers made by the A participant to the two B participants, the decisions of the two B participants, and your own payo.
A.1.3. Part 2: Seq-P
• The main dierence with the rst part is that in the second part A participants can make dierent oers to the B participants and that decision making will be sequential.
Description of the experiment
The experiment consists of 10 rounds. The events in each round are as follows:
At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 3 participants. In each group, one participant will act in role A and two participants will act in role B. The two participants acting in role B will be called B1 and B2. Then there will be four stages:
Stage 1: The A participant can oer the B1 participant in his group a payment. That is, the A participant can oer B1 a payment X1 ≥ 0.
Stage 2: The B1 participant will be informed about X1. Then the B1 participant has to decide whether to accept or to reject the oered payment. That is, the B1 participant decides whether to accept or to reject X1.
Stage 3: The A participant will be informed about whether B1 has accepted or rejected the oer X1.
Then the A participant can oer the B2 participant in his group a payment. That is, the A participant can oer B2 a payment X2 ≥ 0.
Stage 4: The B2 participant will be informed both about X1 and X2 as well as about whether the B1 participant has accepted or rejected the payment X1. Then the B2 participant has to decide whether to accept or to reject the oered payment. That is, B2 decides whether to accept or to reject X2.
Payos
The payos of the B participants
Role assignment and information during the experiment
• At the end of each round, you will be given the following information about what happened in your own group during the round: the oers made by the A participant to the two B participants, the decisions of the two B participants, and your own payo. 
A.2. Quantal response equilibrium
A justication for using the logit function to describe buyer behavior (e.g., buyers' acceptance probability as a function of the oer(s) made by the incumbent) is given by a quantal response equilibrium (see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2005) . The idea here is that players make mistakes (or that real payos are perturbed) but are more likely to play strategies that yield higher expected payos. Let φ : IR → IR + be a strictly increasing and continuous function. Then we assume that the probability F i that i accepts the oer x i (while the other buyer has an oer x j ) is given by
where the probability that j accepts the oer x j is given by
In words, the higher i's payo (165 + x i ) from accepting the incumbent's oer (compared to not accepting and getting expected pay o (1 − F j )500 + F j 165 = 500 − 335F j ), the more likely i is to accept. Figure 1 illustrates the quantal response approach for the case where φ(x) = x λ with λ = 3.5. This approach suggests that the probability of acceptance can be approximated by a logit function.
The signicance of modeling buyer's behavior with a non-degenerate distribution function F can be illustrated as follows. When assuming subgame-perfect buyer behavior, an optimal strategy of the incumbent is to get exclusion for sure by oering (0, 335) in SimDis-P. However, for buyer behavior as described by the example considered in Figure 1 , the incumbent does better by oering the same to both buyers (x = 170). In fact, expected prots for the incumbent equal 223 in this case which are higher than prots assuming subgame-perfect buyer behavior (500 − 335 = 165). Clearly, the exact optimum depends on the parameters. Hence, we use the estimated logit functions in Table 7 and then calculate the incumbent's optimal oers for this logit function.
A.3. Emotional costs of coordination failure
An alternative model based on perturbations of buyers' payos in a simultaneous game that justies using a (non-degenerate) logistic distribution for the acceptance probability as a function of the oer(s) made by the incumbent is the following. Buyers are assumed to suer an emotional cost when they fail to coordinate on rejecting an incumbent's oer.
To perturb the payos to the buyers, we make the following two changes to the framework above.
First, there is a fraction p ∈ [0, 1] of buyers who always reject the oer of the incumbent. These buyers are committed to the Pareto optimal equilibrium (Reject,Reject). Of the remaining 1 − p buyers who are not committed, their payos are given by table A1. The only change is a disutility α ≥ 0 in case the buyer rejects while the other buyer accepts. We interpret this as the disutility from disappointment (emotional cost) that the buyers did not manage to coordinate. 34 The disutility α has a distribution function H(.) with support over the nonnegative real numbers. If player 1 accepts the oer x 1 , his payo equals
If instead he rejects, his expected payo equals
where F 2 is the probability that player 2 accepts the oer x 2 . Let α * 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) denote the type α who is indierent between accepting the oer x 1 and rejecting it. Similar expressions can be written for player 2. Then the probability of acceptance for player j can be written as
with i = j. For the symmetric case, we have x 1 = x 2 and α * 1 (x, x) = α * 2 (x, x) = α * (x). Solving these equations yields a probability of acceptance F (x) = (1 − p)(1 − H(α * (x))) for the symmetric case and F (x 1 , x 2 ) for the asymmetric case. Figure 2 gives an example with a typical shape 34 Another way to model the buyers committed to (Reject,Reject)is to allow for α < 0. However, this seems less intuitive. Reject 165 − α, 165 + x 2 500, 500 for the function F . The dot-dashed curve gives the acceptance probability for the symmetric case as a function of the oer x. For low oers x, the oer is always rejected. As oers increase, the probability of acceptance is positive and increasing in x. Very high oers are always accepted by buyers who are not committed to rejecting oers. The solid line gives the acceptance probability as a function of your own oer, while the other buyer gets an oer of 60. It has a similar shape as in the symmetric case, except that the probability of acceptance is higher (lower) for oers x < (>)60 as the other buyer got a better (worse) oer. The dotted line gives the probability of acceptance as a function of the other buyer's oer assuming you get an oer of 60. Again we see a similar shape of the acceptance function.
Even for oers above 100, the acceptance probability is below 1 − p. Due to the relatively low oer of 60, there are values of α that reject this oer even if the other buyer got a high oer. We simulate 10.000 draws for buyer 1'sα andβ and buyer 2'sα,β andγ. For each draw we calculate the incumbent's optimal oer and derive the exclusion rate and exclusion costs. The histograms of the exclusion rate and costs are given in Figure 4 . The gure shows that our prediction for Seq-P that the exclusion rate is strictly below 1 and the exclusion cost clearly above 0 is robust. Figure 4: Histograms of exclusion rates and exclusion costs for 10,000 draws of parameters for the buyers' acceptance probability functions in Seq-P.
